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Abstract
In the cued-criterion recognition paradigm (Stretch & Wixted, 1998a), trial-by-trial memorystrength based criterion shifts have been an elusive phenomenon. Often the criterion shifts fail to
occur. We suggest that the frequent failure in making criterion shifts in the literature is due to
participants’ failure to understand the rationale of the task as typically presented in an abstract
format. In this study, participants studied words once or thrice and were asked at test to either
classify the probes into “new”, “seen once”, or “seen 3 times” categories by pressing the
corresponding keys, or to make an Old/New binary decision followed by an item presentationfrequency judgment, a confidence, or a memory-quality judgment. No memory-strength cues
were provided and only one set of new items served as distractors for strong and weak targets.
Robust trial-by-trial criterion shift was observed. We concluded that no cues distinguishing
between strong and weak probes are necessary for obtaining this type of criterion shift when the
tasks are designed to make good pragmatic sense for the participants. The reason why this type
of criterion shifts is typically hard to obtain in the cued-criterion paradigm is not that the process
itself is difficult, but that the cued-criterion method is hard to understand to the participants.

Keywords: criterion setting in recognition; criterion shifts in recognition; strength-based criterion
shift; mixed-strength list test
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Decision making and criterion setting are an inseparable part of memory in general and
of recognition memory in particular (Cho & Neely, 2013; Healy & Jones, 1973; Hirshman, 1995;
Jou, Escamilla, Arredondo, Pena, Zuniga, Perez, & Garcia, 2018; Jou, Flores, Cortex, & Leka,
2016; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). Two factors can influence recognition memory: sensitivity
and decision criterion (also known as response bias). Sensitivity is the true ability to discriminate
an experienced event from an unexperienced event. The response bias or criterion is a tendency
toward responding positively or negatively to the stimulus, which is supposed to be independent
of sensitivity. The decision criterion is a threshold that observers place somewhere along the
strength-of-evidence continuum which they use to evaluate the test item for a Yes/No (old/new)
decision. If the test item affords an amount of evidence that meets or exceeds that threshold, a
“Yes” (old) response is made. If the accrued evidence fails to meet the criterion, a “No” (new)
response is made. When the criterion is set high, the observer requires more evidence for a
positive response. When it is set low, the observer requires less evidence for a positive response.
When the criterion is set high, fewer items fall above the criterion, and consequently, fewer hits
and fewer false alarms (FAs) are made, and vice versa. Thus, when a criterion is shifted from a
lower point to a higher point on the strength-of-evidence dimension, the false alarm rate (FAR)
will decrease and the hit rate (HR) will also decrease if the memory strength of the studied items
remains unchanged (See Figure 1).
Insert Figure 1 about here
Within the signal detection theory (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005), recognition accuracy
or sensitivity is measured as a d’ score which is the z-score distance between the means of the
memory strength distributions for the new and old items (See Figure 1). The d’ is calculated
from the HR and the FAR. The higher the HR and the lower the FAR, the better the

4
discrimination between the old and new items, and hence the higher the sensitivity or d’. Also,
observers tend to use a higher criterion for items with better-quality or stronger memory
evidence typically as a result of a stronger encoding (if something is well learned, people require
more evidence for a “Yes” response). In contrast, when items afford weak memory evidence due
to weaker encoding, observers tend to use a more lax criterion (based on less memory evidence)
for a “Yes” response (Healy & Jones, 1973; Hirshman, 1995; Hicks & Marsh, 1998; Jou et al.,
2016; Singer, 2009; Singer & Wixted, 2006; Verde & Rotello, 2007).
Previous studies have shown that lists of words that are all strongly encoded (e.g., with
repeated or longer-duration presentations) produce a higher HR and a lower FAR than lists of
words that are all weakly encoded (with fewer or briefer presentations) (e.g., Hirshman, 1995;
Stretch & Wixted, 1998a, Experiment 1). Because strongly encoded lists produce a higher HR
but a lower FAR than weakly encoded lists, the reversal of the relative magnitudes of these two
measures across the two encoding conditions is known as the strength-based mirror effect
(Bruno, Higham, & Perfect, 2009; Kilic & Oztekin 2014; Stretch & Wixted, 1998a). It is
attributed to the shifting of the criterion from a lower (more lax) memory-strength value for the
weakly encoded item distribution to a higher (stricter) value for the strongly encoded item
distribution on the strength-of-evidence axis (Stretch & Wixted, 1998a).
According to this view, the location on the memory-strength axis of the new-item
distribution does not change because increasing the memory strength of the old items should not
change the familiarity level of the new items. 1 However, under this circumstance, the HR will
increase only if the effect of the enhanced encoding more than offsets the decrease in HR due to
the rightward shift of the criterion. Therefore, the sure consequence of a criterion shift from a
lower to a higher value is the shrinking of the area of the new-item distribution that falls above
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the criterion, i.e., the FA area (again, assuming that the prior familiarity level of the new items
stays the same). See Figure 2 for an illustration. When the FARs of the strongly and weakly
encoded items are the same, this result is taken to be the evidence of an absence of a criterion
shift (Stretch & Wixted, 1998a).
Insert Figure 2 about here
However, typically, the strength-based mirror effect occurs reliably only when the
encoding manipulation is conducted between lists (between-lists or pure-list manipulation in
which all the words in a list are encoded either uniformly strongly or weakly and tested in
separate tests) (Stretch & Wixted, 1998a). When the strongly and weakly encoded words are
mixed together in one list at study and tested within a single test (referred to as the within-list or
mixed-list manipulation), the findings about criterion shifts have been mixed (for a review of the
mixed findings, see Bruno, Higham, & Perfect, 2009, or Starns & Olchowski, 2015). In many
cases, although the HR of the strong encoding condition increased, the FARs for the strongly and
weakly encoded items were the same, indicating an absence of a strength-based, trial-by-trial
criterion shift in the mixed list condition (Higham, Perfect, & Bruno, 2009; Kent, Lamberts, &
Patton, 2018, Experiment 3 using unrelated words among other stimuli; Morrell, Gaitan, &
Wixted, 2002, Experiment 1; Singer, 2009 under a rote learning condition; Singer & Wixted,
2006, Experiments 1 and 2; Starns, Hicks, & Marsh, 2006; Stretch & Wixted, 1998a
Experiments 2-5). 2
The question of why people are disinclined to make a strength-based, trial-by-trial
criterion shift when strongly and weakly encoded items are intermixed within the same list has
puzzled many researchers and generated debates and competing explanations (again, see Bruno
et al., 2009, or Starns & Olchowski, 2015). One explanation for the lack of evidence of a within-
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list, strength-based criterion shift is that a trial-by-trial criterion shift is a cognitively effortful
process, and that participants lack the incentive to make a constant recalibration of their decision
criterion, resulting in their adopting a single criterion for both strongly and weakly encoded
items in the same list and test (Dobbins & Kroll, 2005; Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Hockley &
Niewiadomski, 2001; Morrell et al., 2002; Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007; Stretch & Wixted, 1998a).
Another view attributes the absence of trial-by-trial criterion shifts to participants’ unwillingness
to process the memory-strength cues provided during studying and testing, for example, with the
new items associated with the strongly encoded targets displayed in red, and those associated
with the weakly encoded targets displayed in green color (Starns & Olchowski, 2015). A third
account attributes it to a subjective perception of memorability of the studied items. According to
this account, when people feel confident about their memory, they ignore the memory-strength
cues at test and hence will not shift criteria; when they do not feel confident about their memory
(e.g., as a result of a large number of nonwords on the study list or of a very weak encoding),
they pay attention to the memory-strength cues during a test as a guide for their responses and
hence make criterion shifts (Bruno et al., 2009). A fourth account is that the information
available at test is not relevant or useful for the purpose of making accurate responses. When a
corrective feedback which is informative as to the accuracy of performance is provided,
participants make trial-by-trial criterion shifts (Kent et al., 2018; Verde & Rotello, 2007).
Our view on the issue of the trial-by-trial, strength-based criterion shifts
Changing decision criteria on a case-by-case (trial-by-trial) basis is actually a quite
common practice in daily life. For example, when teachers assign A, B, C, D, F to students’
work, what they do is equivalent to using different fixed criteria to evaluate individual pieces of
work. Similarly, when employers rank-order job candidates on the basis of their qualifications,
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they actually judge each individual candidate with a different criterion. When farmers sort eggs
into grade A, B, and C classes, they are using a different criterion for each egg. Because people
have a well-established schema of sorting or grading performance or objects based on the
qualities of these items, they should not find it difficult to perform a classification task for a
memory event according to the individual item’s memory quality or strength. So, why is it so
difficult to achieve strength-based, trial-by-trial criterion shifts in the Stretch and Wixted’s
(1998a) cued-criterion paradigm, and how plausible are the above several accounts for the
frequent failures in obtaining the mixed-list criterion shifts?
A review of the literature indicates that when words of different frequencies (Stretch &
Wixted, 1998a), sentences from stories (Kintsch, Welsch, & Schmalhofer, 1990), and taxonomic
category words (Singer, 2009; Singer & Wixted, 2006) are used in the study and as test
materials, strength-based (including differential strengths resulting from study-test delay
manipulation), trial-by-trial criterion shifts are often obtained. Other studies found trial-by-trial
criterion shifts when the quality or other attributes of the test probes (instead of the encoding
strength or quality) were manipulated. For instance, when remembered scenes were either
degraded or not degraded in a recognition test, Kent, Lamberts, and Patton (2018) observed trialby-trial criterion shifts with higher criteria used for intact test scenes and lower criteria used for
degraded scenes. Similarly, in a study where participants studied faces without wearing
sunglasses, but were tested with some faces without sunglasses, and some faces with sunglasses,
a mirror effect was obtained, signaling trial-by-trial criterion shifts (Hockley, Hemsworth, &
Consoli, 1999). Also, when the base rate of the target-word occurrence at test was manipulated
and cued, trial-by-trial criterion shifts were observed (North, Olfman, Caldera, Munoz, & Light,
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2018). If the failure in trial-by-trial criterion shifts is due to this process’ high cognitive
demands, then why did this type of shifts occur in the above-cited studies?
On the other hand, when unrelated words are used as study materials and differential
repetitions as strength manipulations mixed-list criterion shifts often fail to obtain. For example,
Stretch and Wixted (1998a) in their Experiment 2 to 5 used a mixed-list strength manipulation in
which strong and weak items were mixed together in the same list, coupled with a cued-criterion
procedure in which the old as well as the new items were each divided into two differently
colored “strong” and “weak” subsets. They consistently failed to obtain trial-by-trial, strengthbased, criterion shifts. Thus, whether or not mixed-list, strength-based criterion shifts are
observed seems to be contingent on the type of the materials and the method used. As will be
shown later in the article, however, the type of materials may not be the main cause for the lack
of mixed-list, trial-by-trial criterion shifts.
As noted, new items of the same word frequency or of the same taxonomic category as the
old items, and un-read sentences from the same story as the read sentences can be recognized as
belonging to the same class of words or to the same story based on the semantic or thematic
relatedness. When the manipulation of memory strength is made between different taxonomic
categories or between different stories, the semantic themes of the categories or the stories
provide useful cues to participants for the strength-based class identification of the new items.
But there are no such conceptual or semantic attributes in unrelated new words that can serve to
bind the new and old words into one memory-strength-based class of materials. Different
coloring (Stretch & Wixted, 1998a) is a perceptual feature and an ineffective means for grouping
the new and differentially strengthened old words into one strength-based class. The fact that
when semantic or frequency information (or other kinds of manipulations as in the above-cited
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studies) is employed, mixed list criterion shifts often occur suggests that it may not be because
the trial-by-trial criterion shifting itself is a cognitively laborious process, but because the color
or other perceptual cues used to mark the unrelated-words as strength-based classes cannot
effectively convey the information of the strength-class membership with which the new words
are cued to be associated. However, the semantic unrelatedness between the targets and
distractors may not be the only or major cause of the lack of strength-based, trial-by-trial
criterion shifts. The other possible factor leading to the failure of the trial-by-trial criterion shifts
in the cueing paradigm may be the way Stretch and Wixted’s (1998a) paradigm operationally
defines criterion shifts.
To our knowledge, the above-mentioned cued-criterion method was first used by Stretch
and Wixted (1998a) and later widely adopted by many researchers investigating this issue, and
has become a benchmark for determining the presence or absence of strength-based, trial-by-trial
criterion shifts (Bruno et al., 2009; Singer, 2009; Singer & Wixted, 2006; Starns & Olchowski,
2015; Stretch & Wixted, 1998a). Some researchers studying the subject of strength-based, trialby-trial criterion shifts elaborated the original cueing procedure and instructions to a
painstakingly detailed level. For example, in their experiments, Starns and Olchowski (2015)
told their participants, “Some of the test words will appear in green on the left side of the screen.
Words in green will either be words that you studied a single time on the study list or words that
were not on the study list at all. You will hit the “s” key if you think the word was studied once
or the SPACE bar if you think the word was not studied at all. Some of the words will appear in
red on the right side of the screen. Words in red will either be words that you studied 5 times or
words that were not studied at all. You will hit the “l” key if you think the word was studied 5
times or the SPACE bar if you think it was not studied at all.” (p. 53). As Koop, Criss and
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Pardini (2019) commented on these elaborate cueing procedures aimed toward guiding
participants to achieving the trial-by-trial criterion shifts, “However, the fact remains that
differences in FAR are only observable on an item-by-item basis when significant affordances
are provided. The affordances may include things like color cuing (Hicks & Starns, 2014; Starns
& Olchowski, 2015; Stretch & Wixted, 1998), ….or forcing individuals to acknowledge strength
distributions through different response keys (Starns & Olchowski, 2015)” (p. 852). Thus, Starns
and Olchowski (2015), as well as some other researchers, seemed to go to a great length to find a
breakthrough within the Stretch and Wixted’s (1998a) original framework. Although they
obtained trial-by-trial criterion shifts in that study, participants might still not know why they
were asked to do such complicated things.
It is suggested that the crucial aspect of the methodology that has led to a frequent failure
in observing trial-by-trial criterion shifts is its arbitrary dividing of the new-item set into two
subsets with each subset marked with perceptual, non-conceptual features such as colors or testitem display locations on a computer monitor screen. The intention is that participants will use
these distinguishing features as a basis for adopting different criteria in judging these two subsets
of new items. We will refer to this widely adopted methodology as the cued-criterion paradigm.
We suggest two possible reasons why the cued-criterion paradigm has typically failed to produce
strength-based, trial-by-trial criterion shifts. First, as noted above, colors and display locations
are not natural “glues” that can cognitively bind the old and new words into a memory-strengthbased class. Word frequency (Glanzer & Adams, 1990; Singer, 2009) and taxonomy (Cho &
Neely, 2013), on the other hand, are conceptually-based attributes of words that can more
naturally serve as such a “glue” to bind the old and new words into one, coherent, strength-based
class of words. Let’s use an analogy from a social judgment task. We typically categorize people
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by features such as gender, age, race, and profession, to name a few. These features are “natural”
social classifiers. In the cued-criterion paradigm, what researchers do, to use this social analogy,
is to have one random group of people wear red shirts (or stand at one location) and another
group wear green shirts (or stand at another location) and then require that participants treat
people dressed in one shirt color as a unified group having a specific social characteristic and
treat people dressed in a different shirt color as another unified group having a different specific
social characteristic. When this is done, people may very well fail to make the social
classification even when the color or location differences are made very conspicuous. In other
words, participants cannot understand and use the researcher’s cueing features as intended.
We suggest that participants should be able to perform strength-based, trial-by-trial
criterion shifting when the task makes common sense to them. In many reasoning and judgment
studies, participants are often found to perform the task very poorly (making logically incorrect
judgments) when the reasoning problem is presented in an abstract, formal, logical format. But
when the problem is presented in the form of a pragmatic issue which participants can relate to
their everyday life experiences, their performance greatly improves (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985;
Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Oliver, 1986). For example, in Wason’s (1966) card-selection task,
when participants were asked to turn over the minimum number of cards among the 4 cards (“4”,
“A”, “7”, “K”) necessary to verify whether the rule “If a card has a vowel on one side, then it
has an even number on the other side” was followed, only 4% of the participants turned over the
two correct cards (“A” and “7”). However, when the logically equivalent problem was presented
in the form of pragmatic permission rules (e.g., minimum age for drinking and required postage
for a sealed letter), the performance improved to 72% correct (Griggs & Cox, 1982; JohnsonLaird, Legrenzi, & Legrenzi, 1973). Another similar example concerns a preference reversal
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phenomenon known as the framing effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) in which people make
contrary decisions on the logically same problem depending on whether it is presented in a
gaining or in a losing perspective. However, Jou, Shanteau, and Harris (1996) showed that the
framing effect vanished when the judgment problem was instantiated in a scenario that
participants could understand on the basis of their pragmatic life experiences. In short, a task
must conform to a scenario that participants can relate to as something meaningful in their
everyday life. Forming word strength classes between studied and unstudied semantically
unrelated words by font color or display location may not be a very “user-friendly” format of
presenting the intended logic.
We believe that still another reason for the frequent failures to observe strength-based,
trial-by-trial criterion shifts in the cued-criterion paradigm is that participants may actually be
making such criterion shifts in those experiments, but that the researchers may be searching for
the evidence “in the difficult-to-find-it place”, so to speak. In the cued-criterion paradigm, the
absence of a strength-based, trial-by-trial criterion shifts is inferred from the equal FARs
between the two differently cued subsets of new items that come from exactly the same
distribution of memory strength values. This equal FARs from the two arbitrarily designated
new-item subsets may not indicate a lack of trial-by-trial criterion shifts. We suggest that each
“Yes” response is based on a different amount of evidence supporting the positive response, and
that participants know whether a given “Yes” response is a solid or a shaky one. We provide
evidence for this assumption later in the article.
The present approach
Just as in everyday life the trial-by-trial criterion shifts can be easily found, they can be
easily found in lab studies as well. That is, the commonly used confidence rating and memory-
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quality assessment using remember-know judgments actually may demonstrate that people can
perform trial-by-trial criterion shifts. If participants are aware that some of their “Yes” responses
in a test are based on more evidence than others and can indicate it, then they are internally using
different criteria for individual responses. In fact, some studies on frequency judgments
(Hintzman, 2004a), judgments of recency (Hintzman, 2004b, 2005) and source monitoring
(Hicks & Starns, 2006a, 2006b) apparently demonstrated trial-by-trial, strength-based criterion
shifts even though these authors were focusing on other issues. For example, the appendix of
Hintzman’s (2004a) study (p. 350, Table A3) indicated that the recognition FAR in
misidentifying a new item as having appeared multiple times was lower as compared with the
FAR in misidentifying a new item as having appeared once. Given that the singular- and
multiple-occurrence items were mixed in the test, this is evidence of strength-based, trial-by-trial
criterion shifts.3
However, to our knowledge, researchers focusing on the cued-criterion paradigm never
brought the above point to attention in the literature. Similarly, researcher taking the memory
rating approach never applied the method to resolving the controversy of trial-by-trial criterion
shifts. Judgment of frequency or recency (Hintzman, 2004a, 2004b, 2005) and source monitoring
work (Hicks & Starns, 2006a, 2006b)4 are relevant to this issue, but to our knowledge, nobody
has indicated in the literature that they are relevant to resolving the issue of trial-by-trial criterion
shifts.
We propose to assess the occurrence or non-occurrence of strength-based, mixed-list
criterion shifts by examining the frequency of FAs participants make when they report that their
“Yes” response is strong versus when they report their “Yes” response is weak. This method
does not involve dividing the new-item distribution into two sub-distributions and marking them
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with different colors. With this method, participants indicate whether a given FA is made as a
result of recognizing a new item as a strong target (equivalent to using a strict criterion) or as a
weak target (equivalent to using a lax criterion). The FAR will be assessed on the basis of an
undifferentiated, single new-item distribution by calculating the proportion of the “strong” and
“weak” FAs, respectively, within the single new-item set. We term this method the uncuedcriterion paradigm. We think that these procedures remove the major stumbling block in the
cued-criterion paradigm.
We used two procedures, a one-step and a two-step response, to make participants
indicate which word-class they think the accepted word belongs to. In Experiment 1, a one-step
response was used. We designated different response keys for participants to use to “sort” the
test items into three categories (“press ‘3’ key if you think you saw the word 3 times at study,
and ‘1’ key if you saw the word once” and ‘0’ key if you think you did not see the word at
study”). This method was basically a frequency judgment task (Hintzman, 2004a). By requiring
the participants to sort the test items into the three classes, we were asking participants to
“naturally” apply multiple response criteria by using memory strength of the test words as the
basis of their response criterion. The crucial diagnostic index for a criterion shift now becomes
whether participants make fewer FAs when they make “3” responses than when they make “1”
responses. It does not matter to what specific new items the FA response is made. The FAR can
be calculated by dividing the number of FAs in the “3” response category and that in the “1”
response category, respectively, by the total number of new items. The crucial difference
between this approach and the cued-criterion paradigm is that in the cued-criterion paradigm, the
FAR of each class of items is based on the frequency of the FAs made to each differentially cued
subset of new items, whereas in the approach we used, it is based on the frequency of any new
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items mistakenly classified either as a strong target or as a weak target. See the graphic
representation of the single, whole new-item set in Figure 3.
Insert Figure 3 about here
According to this notion, the cued-criterion paradigm fails to detect the trial-by-trial criterion
shifts because that paradigm is looking into the “difficult-to-find-evidence place” for evidence of
criterion shifts. If, instead, participants were asked to give the strength class of an accepted item
as they judged it, they would reveal the criterion they used in accepting the item. And the criteria
that they reveal they adopt for different accepted items will be different.
We also used a two-step response procedure in Experiment 2 in which participants first
made a traditional binary “yes/no” response and then a post-recognition frequency judgment. In
Experiment 3, a “Yes/No” response was followed by a confidence rating. In Experiment 4, a
“Yes” response was followed by a memory quality (“Remember-Know”) judgment. By asking
participants to provide a post-recognition judgment on the quality of the accepted probe item,
one can identify responses based on higher criteria versus lower criteria.
The sorting of the probes into the strong versus the weak classes (and the new-item class)
may be considered as using multiple fixed criteria instead of a single criterion that shifts from
one trial to the next. We suggest, however, that there may not be a simple, definitive way to
define what constitutes using multiple fixed criteria versus what is using a single shifting
criterion. Take the above-cited Starns and Olchowski’s (2015) experimental procedure as an
example. The instruction told the participant explicitly that if the probe was green and displayed
on the left side of the screen, it was either presented once or not presented; if the probe was red
and displayed on the right side of the screen, it was either presented 5 times or not presented.
Thus, in the cued-criterion paradigm, the two criteria appear to be explicitly and directly given to
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the participants. It is not easy to decide whether this procedure makes participants adopt two set
criteria or a single switching criterion.
In our view, the underlying mental processes in the cued- and the uncued-criterion
paradigms are probably the same or at least similar. If there is a difference, the difference is that
in the cued paradigm, participants are clearly told that the displayed probe should be judged by
the strong or the weak criterion whereas in the uncued paradigm, participants have to figure out
by themselves which criterion to use for a test probe. Therefore, although both methods may
possibly implement the same underlying mental process, the uncued method does away with the
color, the spatial cues, as well as the two new-item sets. It also requires participants to play a
more self-initiated role in discriminating the strength classes of the probes. As well, the uncued
paradigm may be intuitively more meaningful to the participants.
Experiment 1
We used a mixed-strength list paradigm in which some words of a list were studied three
times and some words were studied only once. At test, participants were asked to indicate
whether the test word was studied zero time (new word), one time, or three times by pressing the
respective number key. The new-item set was not divided into two differently cued subsets. No
cues of any kind were used.
Method
Participants. One hundred and nine UTRGV undergraduate psychology students, 74
females and 35 males, aged 18 and above, participated in this experiment for course credit. These
participants did not do any of the other experiments in this study.
Materials and design. Ten lists of 28 unrelated words were compiled by selecting words
from Kucera and Francis’ (1969) word frequency norms in the frequency range of 100 to 150
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occurrences per million words. Care was taken to see that the words within a list were
semantically unrelated and that no word was repeated across the lists. Seven words were
randomly selected anew for each participant from the 28 words and presented 3 times. Another 7
words were randomly selected from the remaining 21 words and presented once. The remaining
14 words on the 28-word list were used as new (distractor) words in the test. Thus, the list of
words used at study was composed of 14 words, seven presented 3 times and 7 presented 1 time,
totaling 28 presentations.
Procedure. During the study phase, words were displayed in the center of the screen,
one at a time, for 1.5 s per word, with an interword interval of 1 s, in a new random order for
each participant with the constraint that the same word (in the case of the presented-thrice words)
could not be presented consecutively. Participants were told that some words would be
presented three times and some words would be presented once and that they had to pay attention
to the number of times a word was presented because they would be tested for their memory of
the number of times a word was presented. They were further told that no word was repeated
across the lists, and that therefore, their judgment should be based on the most recent list only.
After the study list, participants performed a task in which they counted backwards by 3 at a time
for 20 s. In the backward counting, the program generated a 3-digit random number and
prompted participants to enter a number that was smaller than the generated number by 3. After
typing in the less-3 number, they pressed Enter to receive the next prompt. Participants were
urged to count at a reasonably fast speed. When they made an error in counting, they had to go
back to the previous number to re-count.
At the end of the counting task, the test began. The 28 test words (14 targets and 14
distractors) were presented one at a time in a new random order for each participant. Participants
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were told that they should press the “0” key on the numeric keypad if they did not remember
seeing the word during the study phase, the “1” key if they remembered seeing the word once,
and the “3” key if they remembered seeing the word 3 times. When one of these 3 response keys
was pressed, the test word was erased from the screen and the next test word appeared after a 1-s
blank screen. Participants were told that if they pressed the keys at random the computer
program would detect it and subsequently require them to redo the experiment. The purpose of
the warning was to deter random responses. Nobody repeated the experiment. The same cycle of
learning the 14 list words and testing with the 28 test words was repeated 10 times to complete
the experiment.
Results and Discussion
The proportions of items presented once and thrice that were correctly recognized as
having been presented once and thrice were .723 and .785, respectively (we call these HRs the
specific HRs). An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) showed that the difference between these two
specific HRs was significant, F (1, 108) = 20.40, MSE = .010, p < .0001, ηp2 = .159. As expected,
some presented-once items were incorrectly judged as presented-thrice items and some
presented-thrice items were incorrectly judged as presented-once items. If both a “1” or “3”
responses were considered a hit (which we call the general HR) for each class of items, then the
general HRs for test items categorized as presented-once and presented-thrice items were .811
and .970, respectively. This difference was also significant, F (1, 108) = 297.98, MSE = .005, p <
.0001, ηp2 = .734.
The FAR, which is the crucial piece of information relevant to the question of whether
participants made trial-by-trial criterion shifts, was, as noted earlier, calculated as the proportion
of the whole new-item set that was falsely recognized as either a presented-once or a presented-
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thrice word. We compared the two respective FARs associated with the “3” responses (strong
judgment) and “1” responses (weak judgment). In this method, the total set of new items is
comprised of three types of responses “3”, “1”, and “0” responses, i.e., “strong” FAs, “weak”
FAs, and correct rejections. We use the term Type I FAR to refer to the FAR calculated based on
this whole new-item set. The proportion of the “3” (strong) FAs and that of the “1” (weak) FAs
in this one single, new-item set is taken to be the FAR for the “strong” and “weak” 5 new items,
respectively. The mean “1” response FAR was .091, and that of the “3” response FAR was .006.
The former was 15 times the latter and the difference was significant, F (1, 108) = 112.14, MSE
= .014, p < .0001, ηp2 = .509. Again, the FAR associated with making a “3” response was
significantly lower than the FAR associated with making a “1” response. This is a strength-based
mirror effect. The fact that for the majority of the false acceptances, participants judged a new
item to be presented-once rather than presented-thrice word is clear evidence that they used a
lower criterion for classifying a word as presented-once than as presented-thrice. This result was
consistent with that in Hintzman’s (2004a) study.
Based on the specific HR, the d’ for the presented-thrice items was 3.15, and that for the
present-once item was 2.16. 6 The difference was significant, F (1, 108) = 228.29, MSE = .235, p
< .0001, ηp2 = .679. The criterion c (a value of zero indicates a neutral, a positive value, a
conservatively biased, and a negative value, a liberally biased, criterion, Macmillan & Creelman,
2005) was .685 for the presented-thrice items, and .427 for the presented-once items. The
difference was significant, F (1, 108) = 58.29, MSE = .062, p < .0001, ηp2 = .351.
In a second way of assessing these two FARs, we compared them directly with each other
(Type II FAR). This gives a measure of what proportion of the total FAs was a “1” response and
what proportion a “3” response. A chi-square analysis examined how the pooled FA set (which
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contained both the “1” response FAs and “3” response FAs) was split between these two types of
FAs. 7 Within this pooled FA set, 93.81% was the “1” response FAs, and only 6.19% the “3”
response FAs. The split was far from even, χ2 (1, N =742) = 570.39, p < .0001.
We demonstrated that participants’ classified responses (participants’ judged presentation
frequencies for an item) strongly influenced the FAR. But, did their classified response reflect
the actual presentation frequency of the items? To find that out, we looked at the association
between the classified response and the actual presentation frequency. The association between
these two variables was highly significant, χ2 (4, N =15,260) = 16,107, p < .0001. The response
percentage distribution as a function of actual presentation frequencies is presented in Table 1.
Insert Table 1 about here
Thus, when the experimental task makes sense to the participants, they show evidence of
criterion shifts. Therefore, in our view, looking at the FAR in the red-colored new-item set, and
in the green-colored new-item set, respectively, as in the cued-criterion method, is looking for
evidence in a place in which such evidence is at least difficult to find.
In sum, in the present task, no strength cues of any kind were given to the participants. A
memory task of sorting the test items into three classes based on the number of times an item
appeared in the study list was readily comprehensible to the participants and therefore both the
HRs and the two ways of measuring FAR consistently obtained evidence of a strength-based,
trial-by-trial criterion shifts.
Experiment 2
We provide a brief report on Experiment 2 since it differed from Experiment 1 by a
minor procedural difference. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to make a trinary
response. However, in a typical recognition test, participants made a binary response. The main
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purpose of this experiment was to replicate the results of Experiment 1 by using the normal
binary (“Old/New”) response mode followed by a second response which indicated whether the
accepted word was, in their judgment, a presented-once or presented-thrice word. We assumed
that participants could tell whether a particular Yes response was based on strong evidence or
weak evidence after they made the recognition decision. We predicted that when participants
indicated that a Yes response was based on the evidence of a presented-thrice item, the chance of
making a FA would be lower than when it was based on a presented-once word.
Method
Participants. Ninety-four introductory psychology students (37 males, and 57 females)
participated in the experiment for course credit. Their mean age was 19.98, ranging from 18 to
31. The data from 6 participants were at chance-level accuracy and excluded, leaving 88
participants’ data in the analysis.
Design, materials, and procedure. Participants responded to a test word by pressing either
the “Yes” or the “No” response key. If the response was “No”, the next test word appeared. If the
response was “Yes”, a follow-up question immediately appeared asking them whether they
remembered studying the word once or three times. They responded by pressing either the “1”
key or the “3” key.
Results and Discussion
The .775 mean specific HR for the presented-thrice items was significantly greater than
.674 for the presented-once items, F (1, 87) = 52.53, MSE = .009, p < .0001, ηp2 = .377. The
.950 mean general HR for the presented-thrice items was also significantly greater than the.765
for the presented-once items, F (1, 87) = 321.46, MSE = .005, p < .0001, ηp2 = .787. The
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“strong” and “weak” Type I FARs were .005 and .065, respectively. The latter was 13 times
greater, F (1, 87) = 97.54, MSE = .002, p < .0001, ηp2 = .527.
Based on the specific HR, the d’ for the presented-thrice items was 3.15, and that for the
presented-once item was 2.17. The difference was significant, F (1, 87) = 221.25, MSE = .190, p
< .0001, ηp2 = .718. The criterion c was .730 for the presented-thrice items, and .597 for the
presented-once items. The difference was significant, F (1, 87) = 13.50, MSE = .057, p = .0004,
ηp2 = .134.
Finally, we examined how the FA response pool was split between “1’ and “3” postYes/No judgments (Type II FAR). The percentage of “1” judgments was 92.34%, and that of
“3” judgments was 7.66%. A chi-square analysis showed that they were not equal, χ2 = 618.21, p
< .0001. We conducted another chi-square analysis using the judged frequency and actual
presentation frequency as two variables. The distribution of judged item presentation-frequencies
is presented in Table 2 as a function of the actual presentation frequencies.
Insert Table 2 about here
The result showed that there was a strong association between the judged frequency and the
actual presentation frequency, χ2 (4, N = 26,640) = 25,446.86, p < .0001.
This is evidence of participants shifting between a laxer criterion for endorsing what they
thought was a presented-once item and a more stringent one for endorsing what they thought was
a presented-thrice item.
Experiment 3
Participants in this experiment studied the items in the same way as in Experiments 1 and
2. But at test, they made a Yes/No binary response to each test item and immediately provided a
confidence rating for that response. When people give a higher confidence rating to a decision or
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choice they make, it is analogous to declaring that the decision is based on more evidence, which
is the same as adopting a stricter criterion. Conversely, a low confidence rating indicates the
decision is based on less evidence, which is the same as adopting a more liberal criterion.
Therefore, a confidence rating is taken as an indication of the decision criterion people adopt
(Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; McNicol, 1972; Selmeczy & Dobbins, 2013; Singer & Wixted,
2006; Stretch & Wixted, 1998b; Zawadzka, Higham, & Hanczakowski, 2017).
One advantage of using confidence ratings is that they can be easily related to what
people do in their daily lives and hence make good sense to the participants. For example, when
a professor gives a passing grade to a term paper (assuming she adopts a pass-fail grading
system), the question of how confident she is that the paper deserves a pass is frequently asked
and very intuitively understandable. This also applies to how the grader feels after giving any
other specific grades. And it also reflects the criterion used in giving that grade. Thus, we
predict that “Yes” responses to the presented-thrice items will be associated with higher
confidence than will “Yes” responses to the presented-once items, and in addition, confidence
ratings for FAs should be lower than for hits.
Analogously, a high confidence rating for a “No” response means that the response, in
the participants’ judgment, is based on a very low criterion (very little evidence of having studied
the item) so that if an item does not even meet such a low criterion, it must not have been
studied. Conversely, if a “No” response is given a low confidence rating, that means the response
is likely based on a higher criterion so that the “No” response could probably be a miss response
(the rejected item could have been studied). To foreshadow, our results support this analysis.
Method
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Participants. One hundred and seven introductory psychology students, 74 females and 35
males, aged 18 and above, at UTRGV participated in the experiment to receive course credit.
Two participants gave the highest confidence rating “5” for at least 95% of the trials, and another
participant gave the lowest “1” confidence rating to all trials. These three participants’ data were
not included in the analysis, leaving 104 participants’ data in the analysis.
Materials, design, and procedures. The materials and the study phase of this experiment
were the same as in Experiment 1. The test was somewhat different from that in Experiment 1.
For the test, participants were told that after each Yes/No response, they should immediately
provide a rating regarding how confident they were that their response was accurate, with 1
indicating “not confident at all”, 2 “moderately confident”, 3 “confident”, 4 “highly confident”,
and 5 “absolutely positive”. Unlike in some studies in which the “sure new” was given the
lowest numerical rating, and the “sure old” the highest rating, we used the same confidence
instruction for Yes and for No responses alike. Thus, if participants were most confident that an
item was surely new, they gave it a “5”, just as if they were most confident that it was surely old,
they gave it a “5”. In our opinion, this rating mode is more in line with people’s intuitive
understanding that a higher number stands for a higher confidence in the accuracy of their
response regardless of whether the response is a Yes or a No. The 5 pairs of the rating numbers
and their verbal labels were displayed on 5 rows with one pair per row near the middle of the
screen immediately after the Yes/No response was made. Participants typed in a number
corresponding to their confidence and then pressed the Enter key. Following a 1-s blank screen,
the next test word appeared. Participants were asked to avoid giving a uniform “5” confidence
rating to all responses because, they were told, it was extremely unlikely for one to feel
“absolutely positive” for all the responses one made.
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Results and Discussion
The HR for the weak items was .800, and that for the strong items was .947. The
difference was significant, F (1, 102) = 341.43, MSE = .003, p < .0001, ηp2 = .770. One of the
crucial questions is whether “Yes” responses to the presented-thrice items were associated with a
higher mean confidence rating than “Yes” responses to the presented-once items, and in turn
whether “Yes” responses to presented-once items were associated with a higher mean confidence
rating than the “Yes” responses to the new items. To answer these questions, we conducted an
ANOVA on the mean confidence ratings among “Yes” responses to presented-thrice (strong
hits), presented-once (weak hits), and nonpresented test items (FAs), which were 4.82, 4.28, and
2.84, respectively. The differences were significant, F (2, 202) = 51.79, MSE = 2.06, p < .0001,
ηp2 = .339. A Newman-Keuls post-hoc test showed that the three means were significantly
different from one another. This supports the claim that there was a trial-to-trial shift in the
response criterion because the confidence ratings varied from trial to trial.
We then examined how confidence level of “Yes” responses was related to FARs. We
split the 5-point confidence scale into the high and low categories and used the single, whole
new-item set to evaluate the FARs. Ratings of 4 and 5 were combined to form the high
confidence category, and ratings of 1, 2, and 3 combined to form the low confidence category.
The mean Type I FARs for low- and high-confidence “Yes” responses were .151, and .068,
respectively. This difference was significant, F (1, 102) = 41.24, MSE = .009, p < .0001, ηp2 =
.288.
We showed that higher confidence was associated with higher HR and lower FAR. But
was there an association between the confidence rating and the strength of encoding? To answer
this, we conducted a chi-square analysis with confidence level and presentation frequency of
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words (0, 1, 3) as two dimensions. The percentage distribution of confidence ratings as a
function of presentation frequencies is presented in Table 3.
Insert Table 3 about here
The association between the confidence rating and the encoding strength was significant, χ2 (2,
N=14,237) = 2,177.28, p < .0001. The response distribution showed that the majority of the FAs
(64.77%) were made in the low-confidence category, and the pattern for hits for the presentedonce items (77.81% in the high confidence category) was reversed from that of the FAs. The
response frequency distribution pattern for the presented-thrice items showed that an
overwhelming majority of hits (90.11%) was made in the high confidence category.
Another chi-square test was conducted to determine specifically whether there was an
association between the confidence level and the presentation frequencies of 1 and 3 (the data for
the new items with frequency 0 were excluded), which was crucial for answering the question of
whether participants used a stricter criterion for the strongly encoded than for the weakly
encoded items. The response frequency distribution is presented in Table 4.
Insert Table 4 about here
The association between confidence level and presentation frequency was still significant, χ2 (1,
N=12,846) = 368.06, p < .0001. The response distribution pattern showed that a higher criterion
(as reflected in a higher confidence rating) was used more frequently for the presented-thrice
than for the presented-once items. In sum, with confidence rating as a measure of participants’
adopted response criteria, the data suggest trial-by-trial criterion shifts as a function of memory
strength.
To gather more evidence for trial-by-trial criterion shifts, we examined the data in the
rejected (“No” response) category in the same way as we did the data in the accepted (“Yes”
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response) category. When participants report a high confidence in rejecting a test item, they are
saying that they cannot find much evidence of studying the item to make it meet even a low
criterion. On the other hand, when they reject a test item with a lower confidence, they are
signifying that they use a higher criterion (and hence the probability of making a miss error is
higher). An ANOVA on the “No” response data with presentation frequency (0, 1, and 3) as a
factor and confidence rating as a dependent measure showed that the mean confidence rating of
3.76 for the rejected new items (a correct rejection), 2.80 for the presented-once items (a miss),
and 2.47 for the presented-thrice items (a miss), respectively, were significantly different, F (2,
183) = 54.57, MSE = .791, p < .0001, ηp2 = .374. A Newman-Keuls test indicated that the three
means were significantly different from one another. For the “No” responses, the new items
were rejected at the lowest criterion but with the highest confidence, and the presented-thrice
items were rejected at the highest criterion but with the lowest confidence, and that the
presented-once items were rejected at a criterion in between the two. This suggests that not all
rejections, just as not all acceptances, were made based on a single criterion.
As we did for the “Yes” response data, we conducted a chi-square analysis for the “No”
response data. The “No” response data can provide evidence reciprocal to, but consistent with
the evidence provided by the “Yes” response data. The percentage distribution of “No” response
frequencies as a function of presentation frequency and confidence level is presented in Table 5.
Insert Table 5 about here
The association between the two variables was significant, χ2 (2, N=15,154) = 418.84, p < .0001.
As shown in Table 5, more than half of the correct rejections (55.91%) were made in the high
confidence category. In contrast, the majority of the misses was made in the low confidence
category (68.10% for the presented-once, and 74.02% for the presented-thrice items). When the
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new items were removed, the response distribution shift that occurred between the presentedonce and presented-thrice items as a function of confidence level was still significant, χ2 (1,
N=1,848) = 5.00, p = .026. The response frequency distribution of the reduced data is presented
in Table 6.
Insert Table 6 about here
Thus, just as for the acceptance responses, rejections associated with items of differential
memory strengths were also based on different criteria. The most important point that can be
gleaned from Experiment 3’s results is that participants were able to switch between different
internal criteria for test items of different memory strengths on a trial-by-trial basis.
Experiment 4
We give a brief report on this experiment as the logic of this experiment is the same as for
Experiment 3. In this experiment, after participants made a Yes response, they were asked to
indicate the quality of their memory experience by either responding with a “Remember”
(indicating a recollective memory) or a “Know” judgment (indicating a vaguely familiar
memory) (Gardiner, 1988; Rajaram, 1993; Tulving, 1985). We predicted that a Yes response to
a presented-thrice item would be more frequently based on a “remember” experience than one to
a presented-once item, and that when participants indicated that a Yes response was a
“Remember” experience, the chance that that Yes response was a FA will be lower than when
they indicated that the response was a “Know” experience (Dewhurst, Holmes, Brandt, & Dean,
2006; and Reder, Angstadt, Cary, Erickson, & Ayers, 2002).
Method
Participants. Ninety-three introductory psychology students (36 males, and 57 females)
participated in the experiment for course credit. Their mean age was 20.46, ranging from 18 to
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43. The data of 5 participants showed chance-level accuracy and were excluded, leaving 88
participants’ data in the analysis.
Design, materials, and procedure. After participants pressed the “Yes” key, they were
asked to indicate whether their memory experience for the test word was a “Remember” or a
“Know” experience by pressing either the “r” key or the “k” key. The instruction given to
participants on what constituted a “Remember” or the “Know” experience was closely modeled
after Rajaram’s (1993) instructions.
Results and Discussion
The hit rate was .961 for the presented-thrice items, and .798 for the presented-once items.
The difference was significant, F (1, 87) = 243.65, MSE = .005, p < .0001, ηp2 = .737. The
proportion of new items falsely recognized as a “Remember” old item was .019, and the
corresponding proportion falsely recognized as a “Know” old item was .051. The difference was
significant, F (1, 87) = 35.93, MSE = .001, p < .0001, ηp2 = .293. Within the FA response
category, the “Know” FAs made up 72.35%, and the “Remember” 27.65%. A chi-square
analysis for equal split of FAs showed that they were not equal, χ2 (1, N =868) = 173.44, p <
.0001. Another chi-square analysis showed that the association between the judgment and the
presentation frequency was highly significant, χ2 (4, N = 24,640) = 17,662.49, p < .0001.
The percentages of “New”, “Know”, and “Remember” responses as a function of the
presentation frequency are presented in Table 7.
Insert Table 7 about here
General Discussion
In recognition memory tests, people seem disinclined to change their recognition
criterion for items encoded strongly and weakly within the same list and tested within the same
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test even when many cues are provided to facilitate the discrimination between the two classes of
items (Higham et al., 2009; Morrell et al., 2002, Experiment 1; Singer, 2009, under a rote
learning condition; Singer & Wixted, 2006, Experiments 1-2; Stretch & Wixted, 1998a,
Experiments 2-5; Verde & Rotello, 2007, Experiments 1- 4; Starns, Hicks, & Marsh, 2006; for
reviews, see Bruno et al., 2009, or Starns & Olchowski, 2015). Different hypotheses were
proposed to explain this lack of a consistent, strength-based, trial-by-trial criterion shift (see
Introduction). In the following, we summarize the new conceptual and methodological
contributions made by the present study toward furthering the understanding of the issue of
strength-based, trial-by-trial criterion shifts.
The central point of the present study is, again, to bring to the fore the fact that strengthbased, trial-by-trial, criterion shifts are a commonly occurring phenomenon, both in our everyday
life and in lab settings, and that the reason why in the Stretch and Wixted’s (1998) cued-criterion
paradigm it happens only under such extraordinarily elaborate cueing procedures as in Starns and
Olchowski (2015) is the abstract nature of the cued-criterion test, and the way FAs are measured
in that paradigm. We showed that strength-based, trial-by-trial criterion shifts can actually occur
naturally in such tasks as frequency judgments or source monitoring (Experiments 1 and 2;
Hintzman, 2004a, 2004b, 2005 for frequency judgments; and Hicks & Starms, 2006a, 2006b for
source monitoring) without the aid of any cueing. Also, we demonstrated that the commonly
used confidence rating and remember/know judgments can reflect strength-based, trial-by-trial
criterion shifts, although to our knowledge, nobody has brought these common methods to bear
on resolving this controversial subject. Instead, people working on this issue are trying to achieve
the goal of attaining trial-by-trial criterion shifts by developing more elaborate cueing systems.
We used the commonly employed confidence rating and memory-quality judgments to show that
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each of these simple methods actually reflects people’s capability of making strength-based,
trial-by-trial criterion shifts. However, researchers doing memory-quality rating studies have not
applied these methods to addressing the strength-based, trial-by-trial criterion-shifting issue. To
our knowledge, we are the first to expressly bring these commonly used memory judgment
methods to bear on the specific issue of whether people can make strength-based, trial-by-trial
criterion shifts.
A methodological point we made is that dividing the new items arbitrarily into two
subsets, one marked as “strong” and one as “weak” with physical features may be a major source
of the difficulty in the cued-criterion paradigm. In that paradigm, the ability to make strengthbased, trial-by-trial criterion shifts becomes the ability to comprehend the experimenter-intended
meaning of these cuing labels and act on them accordingly, which, in our opinion, is a different
thing than making a trial-by-trial criterion shift. Instead of “forcing” participants to recognize
that one distractor set is strong and the other is weak by using different color cues and spatiallocation cues, we had participants sort the probes or give a post-recognition rating, and directly
calculated the FAR by using a single distractor set. We removed the color and location cues that
are the standard practices in many studies on this subject-matter (e.g, Starns & Olchowski, 2015,
among others). Thus, in the uncued method, there are no “strong” and ”weak” new-item sets.
We believe that the lack of trial-by-trial criterion shifts often found in the typically used cuedcriterion paradigm is mainly due to the difficulty of the method rather than the difficulty inherent
in the mental process of making a strength-based, trial-by-trial criterion shift.
Finally, as discussed earlier, our findings may be construed as evidence of using multiple
fixed criteria rather than of employing a single criterion that shifts from trial to trial. As we
explained in the introduction, there may be no substantive or definitive way to distinguish
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between these two underlying processes. We suggest that the criterion shifting in the cuedcriterion paradigm may be conceptualized as a form of switching between two fixed criteria.
After participants have encountered several instances of strong and weak items in the test, they
may be able to deduce two fixed criteria, one for items in the green color (weak criterion) and
one for items in the red color (strong criterion), and simply maintain the two fixed criteria and
use the one or the other for a recognition decision. Thus, it seems to us that the distinction is
somewhat fuzzy between the concept of shifting a single criterion and that of using multiple
criteria. We consider it important to recognize the need for a clearer theoretical and empirical
definition of trial-by-trial criterion shifts. At any rate, however, the results we obtained can be
safely regarded as evidence of observers’ capability of using multiple recognition criteria from
one trial to another, if not that of switching a criterion.
We end the discussion with these statements: Just because no difference in FAR is found
between two arbitrarily defined subsets of new items does not necessarily mean that participants
do not shift their decision criteria according to the memory strength of items on a case-by-case
basis in a recognition tests. Most likely, in the cued-criterion paradigm, participants may not
have understood the purpose of the distinguishing cues as intended by the experimenter. We
provided evidence for strength-based, mixed-list, trial-by-trial criterion shifts using no cueing
techniques at all. It is possible that in the previous studies that failed to find evidence of strengthbased criterion shifts, the criterion shifts might have even actually occurred, but that they might
not have been captured in the measures researchers used to index them. Therefore, we conclude
that it is not the trial-by-trial criterion shifts that are hard as a mental process; it is the typical
cued-criterion paradigm that makes it hard to observe.
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Footnotes
1. An alternative interpretation of the mirror effect is the differentiation theory (Criss, 2009;
Shiffrin, Clark, & Ratcliff, 1990; for a summary see Criss & Koop, 2015). According to
that theory, the strength-based mirror effect is not due to a criterion shift, but to an
amplified differentiation between the strong and the weak items caused by an enhanced
encoding, relative to a weak encoding. According to that idea, the more one learns about
a stimulus, the more different it becomes in perception and memory from the un-studied
ones.
2. As long as the strong and weak items are mixed in the same test, participants tend not to
make strength-based, trial-by-trial criterion shifts regardless of whether the two classes of
items are learned in a pure or mixed list condition (Singer, 2009).
3. Hintzman (2004a) investigated whether the duration of study time or the frequency of
presentations was the primary determinant of the frequency judgment and recognition
confidence (or whether there was one common determinant or multiple determinants for
the two judgments). Different FA responses (“1”, “2”, and “3”) for items not presented
at study were listed in a table in the appendix, which showed that “3” FA response was
the lowest. Hintzman’s other studies (2004b, 2005) are also relevant, although he did not
present FARs.
4. The source monitoring approach Hick and Starns’ (2006a, 2006b) used is applicable to
the present topic although they did not discuss the issue of strength-based, trial-by-trial
criterion shifts in their articles.
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5. We put quotations around the words strong and weak when they refer to a new item
because the word does not literally mean strong and weak since the new item had never
been studied.
6. When the HR was 1.0, we changed it to .99; when the FAR was 0, we changed it to .01,
by following the protocol of Hirshman (1995), Jou, Matus, Aldridge, Rogers, &
Zimmerman (2004), and Kilic and Oztekin (2014).
7. In our view, there is no compelling reason to assume a correlation between one response
and another in this experiment, therefore, we conducted a chi-square test to assess the
association between the frequency judgment and the word presentation frequency.
Treating these responses as independent makes the test more conservative (Kachigan,
1986).
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. The decrease in false alarms as a result of an upward decision criterion shift.
Figure 2. A strength-based upward criterion shift from “1” responses to “3” responses in the
test-word sorting tasks of Experiments 1 and 2.
Figure 3. A common new- (distractor) item set for both the presented-once and presented-thrice
items and the decrease in false alarms as a result of a strength-based upward criterion shift.
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Table 1. Percentage distribution of “0”, “1”, and “3” responses as a function of presentation
frequencies in Experiment 1.

Response
Row Percentage
Column
Percentage

“0”

“1”

“3”

90.27

9.13

0.60

89.19

16.75

1.36

18.89

72.48

8.63

9.29

66.21

9.72

3.06

18.53

78.41

1.51

17.04

88.92

Presentation
Frequencies

0

1

3
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Table 2. Percentage of 0 (“New”), studied once (“1”) and studied thrice (“3”) post-Yes/No
judgments as a function of presentation frequency of the test words in Experiment 2.

Presentation Frequency
Row Percentage
Column
Percentage

0

1

3

86.70

10.95

2.35

93.00

23.49

5.03

13.22

68.95

17.83

6.46

67.42

17.44

Post-Yes/No
judgment
“New”

“1”

1.22

10.37

88.41

0.54

9.09

77.53

“3”
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Table 3. Percentage of “Yes” responses as a function of confidence rating and presentation
frequency of the test words in Experiment 3.
Presentation Frequency
Row Percentage
0

1

3

31.12

45.08

23.80

64.77

22.19

9.89

4.32

40.34

55.34

35.23

77.81

90.11

Column Percentage

Low Confidence rating

High Confidence rating
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Table 4. Percentage of “Yes” responses as a function of confidence rating and presentation
frequency of the test words (with new words excluded) in Experiment 3.
Presentation Frequency
Row Percentage
1

3

65.45

34.55

22.19

9.89

42.16

57.84

77.81

90.11

Column Percentage

Low Confidence rating

High Confidence rating
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Table 5. Percentage of “No” responses as a function of confidence rating and presentation
frequency of the test words in Experiment 3.
Presentation Frequency
Row Percentage
0

1

3

82.08

13.98

3.95

44.09

68.10

74.02

92.92

5.84

1.24

55.91

31.90

25.98

Column Percentage

Low Confidence rating

High Confidence rating
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Table 6. Percentage of “No” responses as a function of confidence rating and presentation
frequency of the test words (with new words excluded) in Experiment 3.
Presentation Frequency
Row Percentage
1

3

77.99

22.01

68.10

74.02

82.54

17.46

31.90

25.98

Column Percentage

Low Confidence rating

High Confidence rating
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Table 7. Percentage of “New”, “Know”, and “Remember” judgment as a function of presentation
frequency of the test words in Experiment 4.
Presentation Frequency
Row Percentage
Column
Percentage

0

1

3

88.54

9.60

1.86

92.95

20.16

3.90

25.54

50.31

24.16

5.10

20.08

9.64

Post-Yes/No
judgment
“New”

“Know”

2.60

39.81

57.60

1.95

59.76

86.46

“Remember”
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Figure 1
Memory strength distribution of new and old items and the changes in HR and FAR resulting
from a criterion shift

Low
Criterion

High
Criterion
Criterion
Shift

d’

New
Items

Weak
Memory
Evidence

False alarms
under a Low
criterion

Old
Items

False alarms
under a High
criterion

Strong
Memory
Evidence

Note. HR = hit rate; FAR = false alarm rate. The size of the area of the old-item distribution
falling on the right side of the lower criterion (the solid vertical line) is the hit rate resulting from
adopting a lower criterion. That on the right side of the dashed vertical line (which is smaller
than the former) is the hit rate resulting from adopting a higher criterion.
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Figure 2
Strength-Based Criterion Shift
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Figure 3
A common new- (distractor) item set for both the presented-once and presented-thrice items
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